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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Security Council resolution 1593 
 
1. April 2005 the Security Council, acting under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, voted to refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)1 in resolution 1593.2
    The resolution marked the first time the Security Council referred a 
situation to the ICC and was passed with eleven votes in favor, nil against 
and four abstentions, (China, Algeria, Brazil and most notably the US,) only 
under the condition that personnel from “contributing states outside Sudan” 
who are not parties to the Rome Statute3, non-state parties, be “subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing state…. unless such jurisdiction 
has been expressly waived by that contributing state”.4 This means that 
citizens from states that have not ratified the Rome Statute, such as the US, 
operating in peace keeping missions in Darfur can not be investigated or 
prosecuted by the ICC 
 
1.1.2 Background for the resolution 
 
Ending a process that started five decades earlier5 the Rome statute finally 
provided the international community with a court competent of prosecuting 
international crimes6. 
                                                 
1 International Criminal Court, created by the Rome Statute adopted July 17 1998 
2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), (S/RES/1593 (2005) ) 
3 Rome Statute on the creation of an international criminal court, adopted July 17, 1998 
4 In the following, this condition in its entirety will be referred to as “the condition” 
5 In 1948 the UN General Assembly issued  a resolution asking the International Law 
Commission (ILC) to investigate the possibility and desirability of a permanent 
international criminal court. The ILC concluded affirmative in their rapport of 1950 
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Adopted 17. July 1998 and currently ratified by 100 states7, the statute was a 
milestone in the history of international law. Despite worries that need for 
support from the required number of states resulted in too many 
compromises in the final draft, the adoption of the treaty nevertheless 
provided for the worlds first permanent international criminal court, 
managing to unite the differing views of numerous governments around the 
world into an independent institution created by treaty. The court is built 
upon the principle of complementarity8 meaning the Court may only initiate 
investigations and prosecutions if it decides that national investigations does 
not meet the criteria for such investigation as set up by the Statute9. The 
Court has inherent jurisdiction10 over all member states, State Parties, and 
may also gain jurisdiction by way of referral of a situation from the UN 
Security Council11 or if it has jurisdiction over the state on the “territory of 
which the conduct in question occurred”, meaning that personnel from a 
non-state party operating in peacekeeping missions on a territory of which 
the ICC has jurisdiction could, in theory, be subject of investigation and 
prosecution by the ICC12. 
 Sudan has signed, but not ratified the Rome Statute and is thus a non-state 
party. 
 
The Sudanese region of Darfur has for years been the scene of armed, 
internal conflict that has left many dead and forced even more to relocate. 
Despite ongoing peace talks and peacekeeping forces from the African 
Union being stationed, attacks are still occurring and the need for peace is 
evident. And an important instrument of peace is justice. As Sudan is a non-
state party to the Rome Statute, a referral from the Security Council would 
be the only way for the ICC to gain jurisdiction and start investigations and 
prosecutions. Non government organizations, NGO’s, such as Coalition for 
the International Criminal Court, CICC, and Amnesty International13 etc 
along with several governments called for the Security Council to refer the 
                                                                                                                                                 
- Miskowiak, The ICC, Consent, Complementarity and Cooperation,2000 page 12 
6 By “international crimes” it is meant……….. 
7 For a full list of member states, see www.icc-cpi/statesparties.html 
8 Id Art. 1 of the Statute 
9Id  Art 17 2) of the Statute 
10 Meaning that the court gains jurisdiction over a State upon that States ratification of the 
Rome Statute.  
11 Art 13 b) of the Statute 
12 Id Art. 12. 2 a) of the Statute 
13 See www.iccnow.org and also www.amnestyinternational.org 
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situation to the ICC arguing that impunity for the blood bath should end. 
However, a Security Council resolution can be blocked by a veto from any 
of the five permanent members14 and it was feared that the US who has 
repeatedly stated its opposition to the court would block any attempt of 
referral.  
18. September 2004 the UN Security Council assembled an international 
commission of inquiry  on Darfur ,chaired by Mr. Antonio Cassese15. The 
report presented to the UN Security Council, January 25 2005,16 concluded 
that the crimes documented in Darfur met the thresholds for the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and that the situation in Darfur 
should be referred to the ICC. Furthermore, the report also confirms the 
“inability and unwillingness” of the Sudanese authorities to investigate and 
prosecute those suspected of committing war crimes. 17
 
As such, in an unprecedented move, the Security Council voted to pass 
resolution 1593,and provided for the ICC to obtain jurisdiction18 in Darfur, 
but the condition excluded any non-state parties outside of Sudan, from that 
jurisdiction, thus straying somewhat from the original provisions of the 
Statute. Also the US decision to abstain from voting left many surprised. 
 
 1.3 Issues raised by Security Council resolution 1593 
 
Although the resolution was welcomed by most of the international 
community19, and perhaps not surprisingly the Secretary General of the UN 
Mr. Kofi Annan20 the condition also caused some to express their regret that 
it served as a “double standard”21, meaning that it gave some states the same 
                                                 
14 France, Russia, UK, China and US 
15 S/RES/1564 (2004) 
16 Report of the International Committee of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
General Secretary, pursuant to Security Council Res. 1564, 
www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 
17 Report of the International Committee of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
General Secretary, p 162 
18 Art 12 2 a) 
19 See statement of Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, April 1 2005, welcoming the 
resolution. http://pm.gc.ca
And also Media release of the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer 
April 6 2005, supporting the resolution. http://dfat.gov.au/ 
20 SG/SM/9866-AFR/1157 
21 His excellency Ambassador Baali, Permanent representative of Algeria to the UN 
during the Security Councils 5158th meeting on Sudan 31 0arch 2005 www.un.org 
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impunity the resolution was meant to combat, and also that any agreement 
excluding the “nationals of a state from the jurisdiction of the Court…would 
affect the basis for such jurisdiction and thwart the letter and spirit of the 
Rome Statute22. 
However, the fact that the resolution was passed at all, caused mild surprise, 
as the US ever since the Rome Conference repeatedly has stated that they 
believe the statute is “flawed” and that they will seek other ways of 
punishing war criminals.23 The US’ decision to abstain from voting, thus 
allowing for the resolution to pass was a serious departure from the 
previously stated opposition to the court. 
 
 
Resolution 1593 is interesting not only because it marked the first time the 
ICC was referred a situation by the Security Council, and it is therefore 
exciting to see how the Court operates when it receives such a referral, but 
also because of the controversy surrounding it. Did the Security Council 
exceed their powers by the Rome Statute in excluding non-state parties, 
outside Sudan, from the ICC’s jurisdiction? If so, to what consequence?  
What can we make of the US’ decision to abstain? Does it mean that they  
now embrace the Court, or was it a one shot deal? And what will the referral, 
mean for the ICC when one thinks about the future in the context of its scope 
of jurisdiction and also its legimacy and recognition. These are all questions 
that arise from the April 1 referral of last year and that the international 
community have been debating throughout this year.  
 
Therefore, I will in this paper attempt  to examine the validity of the 
resolution, in the context of whether or not it abbreviates from the 
provisions,in the Rome Statute, or the purpose of the Statute and if so to 
what extent, and to what consequence. Although there is little doubt that the 
UN SC has the right to refer situations to the ICC, does that power also 
cover the right to include conditions in the referral? Thus setting parameters 
for the ICC’s prosecution.  
In addition, I will analyze why the US has opposed the ICC and, with their 
decision to abstain from voting on res 1593, if the US now has changed its 
policy on the ICC, and discuss future scenarios for the ICC. 
                                                 
22 Ambassador Mayoral, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the UN during the 
Security Councils 5158th meeting on Sudan 31 March 2005. www.un.org 
23 John Bolton, Former Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, 
now the US ambassador to the UN, in his remarks to the Federalist Society, Washington 
DC November 14, 2002. To be found at www.state.gov 
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Whenever politics and law are mixed, like here with the UN Security 
Council and the ICC, the results are always complicated, and the more one 
investigate certain issues, new ones always emerge. States are used to 
operate on a political level, and naked, indiscriminate law is sometimes 
perceived as unaccountable due to the fact that it does not take into 
consideration any political agenda, It is in these crosshairs the ICC now 
finds itself in the middle of. The Court is constructed to serve the letter of 
the law, but what happens if that letter is tainted by politics?  
 There are numerous explanations as to how the relationship between the 
Security Council, the US and the ICC works, why it works the way it does 
and how it will work in the future. Most of these arguments involve politics 
to a variable degree, and as such, despite this being a judicial paper, I have 
allowed for some of the political aspects to appear in this paper. However, 
pure political reasoning and speculation, such as the link between Israel and 
the US24 fall outside of this paper. I have also chosen to limit this paper to 
the issue of jurisdiction with regard to the referral and when it comes to the 
discussion of the future of the ICC, I have chosen to focus on the future in 
the respect of how the court will function and what legitimacy it will have. 
The discussion about the inclusion and definition of the crime of aggression 
will therefore not be included in this paper, although it was the subject of 
heavy discussion prior to, and during the Rome Conference, as well as it is 
going to be at the review conference in 2009. 
The paper will then discuss these questions: 
The validity of Security Council resolution 1593, in the context of the Rome 
Statute:  
 Is res. 1593 in accordance with the Rome Statute art. 13 b) 
  Is res. 1593 in disagreement with the prohibition on reservation in the 
Statutes art 120?  
 Does res. 1593 go against the objective and purpose of the Rome Statute? 
In short, is the exclusion of jurisdiction for non-state parties in res 1593, in 
accordance with the letter and spirit of the Rome Statute? 
Furthermore, what will be the consequences of any such disagreement? How 
will it affect the legitimacy as well as the future investigations by the ICC. 
Also, what can be learned, regarding the US’ view on the ICC, by the US’ 
decision to allow the referral to pass? 
 
                                                 
24 For instance, of the 27 resolutions the US has vetoed in the Security Council since 
1987, 20 of them concerned Israel. See www.wikipedia.com 
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2. Methodology 
As we find ourselves in the field of international criminal law, one has to 
examine what constitutes “international criminal law”. In his book, Antonio 
Cassese lists the primary sources as being “treaties and customary law”, and 
the secondary sources to be “general principles of international criminal law 
or general principles of law or in the final analysis such subsidiary sources 
as general principles of law recognized by the community of States”25 In 
other words, the treaty in question is the primary source of law regarding 
this matter.  
The Rome Statute contains the provisions that determine the functions, rules, 
powers, and proceedings of the ICC. It is however, important to note that 
following the adoption of the Rome-statute 17 July 1998, even the more 
optimistic delegates feared it would be another 10-15 years before it entered 
into force. Now only eight years later, not only has it entered into force( July 
2002) but is also currently busy investigating and eventually prosecuting 
war-criminals in Darfur, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. By 
international treaty standards, progress has been remarkably swift. And 
whenever matters proceed quickly, there is always a possibility that 
unexpected situations surrounding the treaty may arise. One may  for 
instance not have taken into account would will/would happen should such 
and such occur. 
 Also, what is put in writing may mean two different things to two different 
parties, and they might argue that their own perception of how an agreement 
was meant to be interpreted is the proper one. Or it could be that two 
different provisions of the same treaty seemingly contradict each other.  
It is therefore sometimes necessary to look beyond the written word and try 
to find the interpretation that is closest to the original meaning. 
The International Criminal Court was created by treaty, the Rome Statute, 
and is therefore an independent, international institution regulated by 
                                                 
25 Cassese, Antonio, International Criminal Law, US 2003. p.26  
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international law. As such, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties26 
of 196927, is the point of departure for any discussion or interpretation of the 
Rome Statute.  
Art. 31 1. of the Vienna Convention states that all treaties should be 
interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the lights of its object 
and purpose” 
This means that whenever there is a disagreement as to how the treaty, or 
certain provisions of the treaty is to be interpreted, one has to examine for 
what purposes the treaty was made and be interpreted  in the context of that 
object and purpose. In addition art. 31 3 b) of the Vienna Convention reads 
that one should also take into consideration “any subsequent practice in the 
application” and art. 32 states that the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its discussion” are to be given weight when interpreting the 
treaty. The Vienna Convention determines what is to be considered when 
interpreting a treaty, what should be weighed important and what should be 
viewed as less important. If one were to interpret a treaty in conflict with the 
Vienna Convention, such an interpretation would not be valid and as such, 
any actions derived from such an interpretation would be void. 
 However, Art’s 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention states that each treaty 
is to be interpreted in the context of the creation, object and purpose of the 
treaty.   
 Therefore, when analyzing and determining the validity of resolution 
1593,in the context of whether or not it is in accordance with the Rome 
Statute, it is important to bear in mind how and for what purposes the 
International Criminal Court was created.  
 Therefore I will dedicate the first chapter to study why, or if, we need the 
ICC, the background and making of the Rome Statute and the proceedings at 
the Rome Conference as well as the results of the Rome Conference itself. 
What does the statute say? 
The history of the Rome Statute is thoroughly described in several books 
about the ICC28. As this paper is only of a certain length, I have tried to 
                                                 
26The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted in Vienna 23 May 1969.  In 
the following to be referred to as “the Vienna Convention” To be found at www.un.org 
27 www.un.org 
28 Schabas, William A, An introduction to the International Criminal Court UK 2001 p.1-
21 
McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly, The Permanent International Court, Legal and Ploicy 
Issues  US 2004 p.9-45 
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recapture the most important points in my own words and formulations. For 
a more thorough presentation and the background and history I refer to the 
listed literature. The official websites of the UN29, the US 30and the ICC31 
have also been helpful when searching for the official documents and 
statements in this regard. 
Throughout the following chapter I will then evaluate the validity of the 
resolution in terms of its consistency with the Rome Statute, by first 
examining what powers are granted the Security Council by both the UN as 
well as International Law and also by the ICC. The Un charter32 and the 
Security Council relationship agreement33 with the ICC will be the basis of 
this study. 
  I will then attempt to analyze and interpret the Rome Statute, especially art 
13 b) which gives the Security Council the power of referral, but also art 120 
which prohibits reservations, in order to find whether or not the condition in 
resolution 1593 was in accordance with the Statute, and also what the 
consequences of any inconsistency might be. 
 As the Vienna Convention states, in order to interpret the Rome Statute in 
the closest way possible to its original meaning, one has to constantly 
interpret in the context of the Courts purpose and objective as found in 
chapter 2 regarding the ICC’s background.  Furthermore, the actions by the 
parties to the treaty following its adoption may give indicators as to have a 
certain provision was perceived to mean. The negotiating history, such as 
drafts and comments prior to adoption and also during its adoption can also 
be helpful when determining how the treaty or a provision of the treaty was 
meant to be perceived. I will use the ILC drafts of 1994 and 1996 in order to 
see if they might provide any information as to how the Rome Statute is to 
be interpreted, especially in the context of res. 1593, as these drafts were the 
basis of the negotiations at the Rome Conference. By examining what 
provisions were kept what was added and what was not incorporated into the 
final Statute one might get an idea of what was perceived as particularly 
important or not important to the framers of the Statute, If one of the 
provisions in the 1996 draft was not included, or included in an altered state, 
in the Rome Statute that might indicate that this certain provision was given 
                                                                                                                                                 
Miskowiak, Kristina, The International Criminal Court: Consent, Complementarity, and 
Cooperation Copenhagen 2000, p. 9-15 
29 www.un.org 
30 www.state.gov 
31 www.icc-cpi.int 
32 Charter of the United Nations 
33 Agreement of the relationship between the UN  Security Council and the ICC  
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extra consideration and that in the end the delegates felt that it would not 
serve the Courts interest if it were to be included, or included without 
alteration. It could also be that it was stricken because of the need to 
compromise in order to get the statute adopted. In any event, where the 
Rome Statute differs from previous drafts, it may indicate that the provision 
at hand was too controversial or that the framers found a better solution. In 
the cases where the Rome Statute incorporated word for word, or almost, 
what was written in the ILC drafts of 1994 and 1996, one can assume that 
these provisions were thought solid and unquestionable, thus giving less 
room for interpretation. In addition, statements, speeches, interviews and 
comments by government officials will be given some weight as to how the 
different states view on the matters at hand, however not to the same extent 
as official documents and agreements.34
  In chapter three, I will examine further what it is about the ICC that the US 
opposes to, and also what could have led them to allow for the resolution to 
pass as well as possible scenarios of the future of the ICC. To aid me in this 
study, the US governments website www.state.gov and also the official 
website for the UN www.un.org were of great help, guiding me to official 
statements and press releases.  
In the conclusion I will try and nest up all loose ends and make a preliminary 
conclusion as to what I believe will the most likely  path for the ICC and the 
US’ relationship, or lack thereof, with the court, as well as some thoughts on 
how I think they should be. 
 
3. Background of the ICC 
 
3.1 The need for the ICC 
 
As far back as the middle ages,35 society has displayed a will to punish those 
responsible for committing crimes that go against the moral code of 
civilization. However, the lack of a permanent international criminal court 
                                                 
34 Speeches, remarks and statements by State Officials and articles on this subject are 
found at www.asil.org, www.derechos.org, www.ejil.org, www.law.duke.edu among 
many. See index of literature for full list. 
35 IN 1474, Peter Von Hagenbach was prosecuted for crimes ordered during his 
governorship of Breisach. See V. Morris and M.P. Scharf, An insiders guide to the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia vol.1, (1995) New York : Transnational 
Publishers,  
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competent of prosecuting suspected war-criminals36 has rendered any 
attempts random and has resulted in an inconsistency in both prosecutions 
and judgments as well as adding a feel of “victors justice”, an argument 
many Germans felt valid after the Versailles treaty and also following the 
Nuremberg trials. 
In addition, politics have also contributed in the difficulties of punishing 
war-criminals. Whenever a state obtains great financial, or other, gain from 
dealing with a state/representatives of states that are carrying out 
international crimes, it can often be hard to find the willingness to  prosecute  
those responsible if it will entail loss of said gain. Or it could be that the 
domestic political climate, or national legislature37 does not allow for 
prosecutions of this kind. 
Nevertheless, the need for an institution such as the ICC is important as , in 
the words of UN General Secretary Kofi Annan; “Without justice, there can 
be no peace”. Combating impunity is a just one of the steps towards 
reconciliation. People who have suffered great wrongdoing will have a need 
for vindication in one way or another in order to feel justice restored. When 
that sense of justice does not arrive in the form of a judicial response, there 
is always a risk that it will reveal its face in a violent reply such as suicide 
bombing, terrorism  etc, which in turn might lead to more violence, thus 
proving Mr. Annan right. 
 Imagine a society without an effective legal system. Those who commit 
crimes as an act of passion might do so regardless, but without a possibility 
of punishment, impunity would lead many more to resort to  crime. This is 
why all states have a legal system and it is why the international community 
needs a legal system, to function where national legislature fall short.  
And this is where the crux of the challenge for international criminal law. 
When it comes to jurisdiction the norm,according to Cassese, is that States 
through their courts prosecute their citizens, perpetrators of crimes 
committed on their territory, or perpetrators of crimes that victimized that 
states citizens. The latter from of jurisdiction being the most recent. 
                                                 
36 As illustrated by Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and suspected of 
being responsible for the killing of between 1.5 and 2.3 miilion people from 1975 to 
1979. He was never convicted of any international crimes before he died in 1988. Source; 
www.en.wikipedia.org 
37 The US Senate has for instance a Constitutional right to propose reservations to treaties 
before ratifying them, the US therefore argue that ratifying the Rome Statute would be 
unconstitutional as it prohibits reservations 
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However, what happens when the States themselves are involved in the 
crimes? Or if there is no national court with the jurisdiction to prosecute? 38
Then we see the need for an international criminal court, with universal 
jurisdiction. 
There are different ways of constructing an international criminal court. In 
the absence of a permanent international criminal court, the 20th century saw 
the creation of several ad hoc tribunals39in order to prosecute and punish 
those responsible for committing crimes against the peace and security of 
mankind, crimes which definitions were formulated in the International Law 
Commission40(ILC) draft on the creation of a permanent international 
criminal court to the UN General Assembly (GA) in 195041, to become 
known as “the Nuremberg principles”. Both the trials of Nuremberg and 
Tokyo following WWII were ad hoc tribunals… In the recent years we have 
seen the creation of ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda, ICTR, and the former 
Yugoslavia, ICTY. Another option is the creation of hybrid tribunals42 such 
as the tribunal set up in Sierra Leone43
The benefits of both an ad hoc tribunal and a hybrid tribunal  is that they 
derive their power directly from the UN Security Council acting under 
chapter VII of the UN Charter, and are specifically designed for a certain 
situation. A permanent international criminal court would perform much in 
the same manner as any domestic legal system would, with the bench of 
judges and a prosecutor already at hand, and a set framework to be applied 
to wherever deemed necessary. A permanent court would thus go a long way 
to eradicate random and selective prosecutions that ad hoc and hybrid 
tribunals sometimes seem to represent. Furthermore, a permanent court 
would be better equipped to initiate investigations and prosecutions of 
alleged crimes rapidly, possibly even before they stopped, whereas ad hoc 
tribunals would need a Security Council resolution, and a commission prior 
to that before it could even start to assemble a tribunal. Thus it could be 
argued that a permanent international criminal court would be the best way 
to combat impunity for war criminals in a swift and just manner. 
 
                                                 
38 Cassese, Antonio, International Criminal Law, US 2003 p.6-9 
39  Ad hoc tribunal- A tribunal set up by the Security Council under a chapter VII 
resolution, to cater to a specific situation. 
40 ILC-International Law Committee, A UN organ of legal experts. 
41 For full text, see www.un.org 
42 Hybrid tribunals- tribunals set up by the Security Council under chapter VII, drawing 
on both UN assistance and local representatives. 
43 See www.sc-sl.org 
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3.2 Historic background 
 
 The first to propose a permanent international criminal court is believed to 
be Gustav Moynier, one of the founders of the Red Cross. In 1872, after 
witnessing the gruesome acts committed during the Franco-Prussian war, he 
argued that an international criminal court would serve to uphold the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1864. 
 Although the proposal proved to be almost a decade premature, the idea of 
such a court was nevertheless implemented in the consciousness of the 
international community. During the post WW1 period, two proposals were 
put forth to the League of Nations calling for the establishment of an 
international criminal court, however neither resulted in anything 
substantial. 
Following the ad hoc tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, the UN, replacing 
the League of Nations, asked the ILC to investigate the desire  and 
possibility of establishing a permanent international criminal court.44,  
The ILC submitted draft statutes on an international criminal court in 195045 
and in 195346 but progress was halted in large part due to the cold war and 
also the inability to agree upon a definition of the term “aggression”. 
In 1981, the ILC was asked by the General Assembly (GA) to resume their 
work on drafting a statute for an ICC, and although they turned in several 
reports and contributed to many debates, the issue of jurisdiction of the court 
was not subject to nearly the same amount of attention as the list of crimes, 
definition of crimes and the penal system.47
  
3.3 The road to Rome 
 
  Interestingly, it was Trinidad and Tobago who, heading 16 Caribbean  
states plagued by the 80s drug epidemic, requested the GA to ask the ILC to 
give “extra consideration to the matter of jurisdiction.”48  The proposition 
originally stemmed from a desire for a court with jurisdiction to prosecute 
drug smugglers operating across multiple borders, but in the end the Rome 
Statute only included the very worst of crimes, such as genocide and war 
crimes.49 The proposition did however lead to a draft statute prepared by the 
                                                 
44 GA RES 260(III) 
45 The Nuremberg Principles, www.un.org 
46 The Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, www.un.org 
47 Schabas, William A, An introduction to the International Criminal Court, UK 2001, p.9 
48 A/RES/44/16 
49 Art.5 of the Statute 
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end of 1993 and submitted to the GA in 1994, containing the suggested rules 
of procedure and elements of crimes for an international criminal court.  
 
In parallel to the UN commissioned work on an international criminal court, 
the world witnessed the atrocities of the Balcan war and the brutal internal 
conflict in Rwanda further highlighting the need for a permanent 
international criminal court, able to react in a swift and just matter to prevent 
such acts in the future. Although the two ad hoc tribunals who were set up to 
prosecute criminals in Rwanda an former Yugoslavia performed admirably, 
many felt that the bureaucratic paperwork that had to be done in order to set 
up the tribunals was too costly and time-consuming. A sense of tribunal 
fatigue set in in most of the UN system, that the creation of ad hoc tribunals 
took up too much time of the Security Council and resulted in the prolonging 
of attacks in Rwanda and the Balcans. Also, there was wide recognition that 
ad hoc tribunals “remained inherently selective” as the Canadian delegate to 
the Rome Conference stated50, meaning that ad hoc tribunals had to be 
created by resolution from the Security Council,which is a political organ 
and as such has other criteria for what constitutes an investigation and 
prosecution than a judicial court. 
 
 After almost 50 years of working on the establishment of an ICC, progress 
in the 90s was thus remarkably quick. 
 After reviewing the draft submitted to them by the ILC in 199451, GA set up 
a preparatory commission 11 Dec 1995 and charged it with preparing a 
“widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an international 
criminal court as a next step towards a diplomatic conference. 
 The “prep-com” then presented the GA with a list of several proposed 
amendments to the 94 ILC draft in 199652. In 1997, the “prep-com” held 
three additional meetings producing the “report of the preparatory 
Committee on the establishment of an International Criminal Court” in 
199853, which contained various proposals to a more coherent text. After the 
zuthpen draft was reworked at the final “prep-com” session in 98 it 
represented the final draft for the convention on establishing an international 
criminal court, which was to be the basis of the negotiations in Rome. 
                                                 
50 (2001) 46 McGill Law Journal L.J. 1141 p. 1147 
51 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with commentaries 1994, 
www.un.org/law/ILC/ 
52 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries 
1996, www.un.org/law/ILC/ 
53 A/CONF.183/2 
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3.4 The Rome Conference 
 
From 15 June to 17 July 1998, Rome was the host of the diplomatic 
conference, which eventually ended up producing the Rome-statute. 
At Rome, it soon became apparent that the international community, 
represented by their delegates, disagreed in their views on an international 
criminal court. Delegates soon split into two groups with opposing views. 
States like Norway, Sweden, Denmark who became known as the “like-
minded” group, pressed for an effective, competent court with inherent 
jurisdiction, no Security Council veto on prosecutions as well as an 
independent prosecutor. 
 Their view was countered by that of what became known as the “restrictive 
group”, among them France, US, China and Israel, who insisted on state 
sovereignty and “extensive state or security council control” 
Throughout the following five weeks work was being delegated to various 
sub-committees and provisions of the statute were slowly being adopted one 
after another. 
Despite this progress, key issues such as the role of the Security Council and 
the scope of ICC jurisdiction were still not being openly debated although 
much lobbying took place on both parts. The relationship between the ICC 
and the UN Security Council was the subject of particularly much 
discussion. Views ranged from that of India, who wanted no Security 
Council control of the ICC as they felt it would further embellish the uneven 
distribution of power already illustrated by the five permanent members of 
the Security Council, Pakistan supported this view, claiming that to give the 
Security Council power to refer situations to the ICC would “undermine the 
principle of complementarity” and that only “a State Party should be able to 
activate the trigger mechanism”54. The US on the other hand, wanted total 
Security Council control of the ICC. Given that the US holds a permanent 
seat in the Security Council, Security Council control of the ICC would in 
fact mean US control of the ICC. The inclusion of crime of aggression, and 
especially the definition of “aggression”, was also heavily debated. Cyprus 
was among those who wanted it included, but the US did not.  
On the last day of the conference, chairman of the committee of the whole, 
which had the responsibility of overseeing the conference and also were 
responsible for dealing with the afore mentioned key issues, Philippe Kirsch 
presented the delegates with a “ take it or leave it “package which basically 
                                                 
54 GA/L/3079 
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was what became the Rome Statute. Although the Committee of the Whole 
had preferred to adopt the treaty by consensus, giving it a broad recognition, 
the US insisted on a vote and the Statute was subsequently adopted  with 
120 votes in favor, 20 abstentions and seven against, Although the vote was 
unrecorded, it is likely that among those who opposed the statute were the 
US, China and Israel. 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Results of the Rome Conference  
 
With the adoption of the Rome Statute July 17 1998, the foundation for a 
permanent international criminal court was finally completed. 
Although the majority of the international community were supportive of the 
adoption, as evident through the large number of signatures, almost every 
state had some form of concern about the Statute itself. During its discussion 
of the establishment of the ICC October 1998, the members of the sixth 
committee (Legal) of the UN, these concerns were addressed55The Russian 
delegate, L.A Skotnikov said that “the relationship between the Court and 
the UN Security Council…(was based) on cooperation in the best interest of 
the international community” and that was only one of the elements that 
caused Russia to be supportive of the Statute, although Russia “regretted that 
several proposals had not been included….and that the document had been 
passed by voting”. Naste Calovski, of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, stated that although his country had signed the Statute and 
would ratify it, Macedonia felt that a number of issues should be clarified, 
among them the relationship between the Court and the Security Council. 
The dominant view of the states that signed the Statute can best be summed 
up by the words of the Swedish delegate at to the Sixth Committee, Per 
Norstrøm, who said that “it ( the Statute) represented the best package which 
could possibly be obtained under the prevailing circumstances” and that one 
should look at “ the totality of what was achieved”. This  illustrates that 
when determining the legality of re. 1593, in the context of whether or not it 
is in correspondence with the Rome Statute, one should take into 
consideration that while the Rome Statute may have been flawed, it did 
create the ICC. Likewise although, res 1593 may be flawed, it did enable the 
                                                 
55 UN Press Release GA/L/3079 
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ICC to obtain jurisdiction in Darfur, and that is “what was achieved by re. 
1593” 
And what was achieved in Rome 1998, was a Statute providing for the 
establishment of a permanent international criminal court as an independent 
organ, with jurisdiction over crimes listed in art 5 of the Statute and also 
jurisdiction over any state that becomes a party to the treaty.. 
The court has an prosecutor with the power to launch his own investigations, 
providing jurisdiction. Other ways of bringing the court into action is by way 
of referral either by a State Party or by the Security Council, art’s 13a) and 
13b). Art 13b) is the equivalent of art 23(1) of the ILC draft and is intended  
to “avoid the establishment of ad hoc tribunals by the Council”56 By being 
referred a situation from the Security Council, the ICC may gain jurisdiction 
over nationals of non-state parties. 
The Statute also gives the Security Council the power to defer investigations 
by the ICC for a period of up to 12 months, art 16. However, this is an 
important shift from the proposed 1994 ILC draft. Art 23(3) of the ILC’s 
draft stated that the Security Council had the power to defer investigation 
until it (SC) allowed for the investigation to proceed, meaning a veto from 
any of the permanent members would stop the investigation. In the Rome 
Statute, this is reversed, only giving the Security Council power to pass a 
resolution in order to defer investigation. As such, a single veto would not be 
sufficient to halt proceedings by the ICC. The inclusion of Art 16 was an 
attempt to limit the concerns raised by several states at Rome regarding the 
political aspects of the court. It is nevertheless of importance to keep in mind 
that after art 103 of the UN Charter, acting under chapter VII , the Security 
Council could pass a resolution of the creation of an ad hoc tribunal for 
instance that would have superior rank to the Rome Statute, as all member 
states of the UN are bound by the Security Councils resolutions under 
chapter VII. 
 The Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction regarding the crime if aggression, Art 
5d), but leaves the definition to the review conference to be held in 2009, 
Art 121.  
Furthermore, the statute does not allow for any reservations, meaning that 
there is no “opt-in” clause. The ILC draft envisioned a Statute only giving 
the Court inherent jurisdiction with regards to the crime of genocide, leaving 
                                                 
56 Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The relationship between the security Council and the ICC”, 
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Weltpolitik 2001, 
www.Globalpolicyforum.org. 
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it up to the states to determine which of the other crimes as listed in art.5 it 
would accept. 
 
When the ICC entered into force in July 2002, with the swearing in of its 18 
judges and its prosecutor, the world finally witnessed a permanent 
international criminal court ready to investigate and prosecute charges 
brought before them. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.The validity of res.1593 in the context of its consistency with the Rome 
Statute 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, of the key issues in all of the five preparatory commissions 
leading up to the Rome conference in 1998 was the relationship between the 
ICC and the UN Security Council. 
The ICC is an independent organ, with inherent jurisdiction over states that 
have ratified the Rome Statute, State-parties, 57 and over the crimes listed in 
Art 558 The ICC, the “Court”, can exercise its jurisdiction if a situation is 
referred to the prosecutor either by a State Party 59, or  the UN Security 
Council60, or the ICCs prosecutor himself can initiate investigations61. 
However, non-state parties may only fall under the jurisdiction of the court 
                                                 
57Id  Art 12 1. Of the Rome Statute ( the Statute) 
58 Id Art 5 of the Statute lists genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
aggression as the crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction. The crime of aggression 
however, has yet to be defined.  Art’s six through eight further define the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes respectively 
59 Id Art 13 a) of the Statute 
60 Art 13 b) of the Statute 
61 Art 13 c) of the Statute 
 19
following a chapter VII resolution by the Security Council62, which in turn 
constitutes a previous determination under art 39 of the UN Charter. 
 As Sudan is a non-state party to the Rome statute, the 1. April referral was 
the only way for the ICC to commence investigation, and prosecution of 
suspected war criminals in Darfur.  
  After reviewing Cassese’s report on Darfur , the Security Council 
concluded that the situation in Darfur constituted a “threat to the peace and 
security of mankind”, although not labeling the conflict genocide as US 
president George W. Bush did in the fall of 2004, and acting under chapter 
VII of the UN charter referred the situation to the ICC and its chief 
prosecutor Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo. the UN Security Council resolution 
1593 of 1 April 2005 referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. 
This referral was made possible by art13 b) in the statute, acting under 
chapter VII of the UN charter. However, Art 13 b) of the Statute only states 
that the Security Council may refer a situation to the ICC, it does not say 
anything further about the power to include a condition in the referral.The 
condition in Res. 1593 means that personnel from non-state parties, like the 
US, operating in peace-keeping operations in Darfur, will not become the 
subject of the jurisdiction of the ICC, save explicit consent from that persons 
state. Art 12.2 a) of the Rome Statute on the other hand, dictates that the 
Court may exercise jurisdiction if “the state on the territory of which the 
conduct in question occurred” is under the ICC’s jurisdiction. In this case, as 
Sudan is now under the jurisdiction of the ICC by way of Security Council 
referral, personnel from non-state parties operating in peace keeping 
missions in Sudan, should be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction. It may 
therefore seem as if res.1593, or at least the condition tied to it, is not in 
accordance with art.12.2 a) of the Rome Statute.  
 The question then presents itself; Was res.1593 consistent with the Powers 
given the Security Council and the ICC under International Law and the 
Rome Statute? 
When analyzing this problem one has to first find under what basis the 
security council derive their right and how far those powers reach. 
 
4.2         The Security Council and its powers 
 
The UN Security Council is made up of five permanent members and ten 
elected ones alternating every two years. At the moment the permanent 
                                                 
62 Article 13b in the ICC statute allows the security council to refer situations to the ICC 
acting according to the UN charter chapter VII 
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members are France, U.K, China, Russia, The US63. There have been 
suggestions that Japan, India or an African state should be awarded a 
permanent seat to help even out the power balance in the Security Council, 
but nothing has materialized of it. The Security Council is responsible for 
the upholding of international peace and security and under chapter VII of 
the UN charter has the power to decide what “measures shall be taken to 
restore international peace and security”  in situations constituting “any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” , art 40 and 39 
of the charter respectively. It is also in charge of determining what 
constitutes such crimes. 
 In order for a resolution to pass it must have nine votes in favor, however 
each of the five permanent members have a right to veto any resolution 
(although not technically a veto, but more of a response in form of “nay”, 
the effect is nevertheless the same”) 
 Some members of the UN have proposed limitations of the use of veto to 
chapter VII resolutions, but to do so could prove to be the demise of veto . 
power in the Security Council in entirety and as long as the veto power is 
used cautiously the UN sees no reason to put limitations on its use, even if 
they could. Since the end of the cold war, there has  been 50 vetoes to 
Security Council resolutions, 34 of these have been by the US64. 
All chapter VII resolutions are binding to the UN member states, and as of 
Nov. 12 1956, Sudan has been a member. However, Chapter VII resolutions 
require a predetermination under art. 39 of the UN Charter that the situation 
must constitute a threat to, or breach of the peace and security of mankind or 
an act of aggression, and as the Security Council already in 2004 concluded 
affirmative65the Security Council acted within their capacity regarding the 
UN Charter66, by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC. As the powers 
given the Security Council by chapter VII resolutions are quite wide, the 
Security Council had full authority to exclude certain nationalities from the 
ICC’s jurisdiction. The problem however is:  is res. 1593  inconsistent with 
the Rome Statute, and if so, will it then be binding on the ICC? Before we 
study the Security Councils ability to bind the ICC, it could serve to examine 
                                                 
63 The elected seats are currently occupied by Argentina, Denmark, 
Democratic republic of Congo, Ghana, Japan, Qatar, Greece, Peru, Slovakia 
and Tanzania 
 
64 Source, www.globalpolicy.org  www.en.wikipedia.org 
65 A/RES/44/16 
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the relationship between the two and what provisions are to be found in the 
Rome Statute regarding the power of referrals  and jurisdiction, and also 
what provisions the ICC has imposed on itself in this regard 
 
 
4.3 The Security Council vs. the ICC 
 
The ICC is an independent institution, but enjoys a close relationship with 
the UN. Not only was it created as a brainchild of the UN and with UN help, 
art. 2 of the statute furthermore states that there shall be a relationship 
agreement between the UN and the Court. That relationship agreement67, 
signed in 2004 regulates the way the Court and the Security Council are 
linked together. 
 
4.4Art 13 b) “situation” 
 
Now, art 13 b) gives the Security Council authority to refer a situation to the 
ICC.  However, it states nothing further, it does not say anything about the 
nature of such a referral. The exact wording of art 13 b) is “The Court may 
exercise jurisdiction…if a situation in which one or more of such crimes 
appears to have been committed is referred to the prosecutor by the Security 
Council acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”.  
   It could be argued that the inclusion of a condition in the referral of 1 April 
2005 represents an overreach of the Councils powers after art 13 b).  
Such an argument was made by Dr. Koechler, who in a response to the 
resolution68 claimed that the referral “ violates the letter and spirit of the 
Rome-statute of the ICC and severely undermines the courts efficiency, 
credibility and legitimacy” . 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the security council only has the power to 
refer situations, and not individual cases or persons. 
As such, the Security Council can not refer Osama Bin-Laden to the ICC,  
It can then be argued that where there is no power to refer cases/persons to 
the ICC there is no power to defer cases/ persons to the ICC. 
Again, the security council has the right to defer situations after art 16,  
Hence, a case can be made that by exempting certain individuals, in this case 
citizens of a non-state party, from the ICCs  jurisdiction, the security council 
                                                 
6767 SC/ICC relationship agreement……. 
68 68Dr. Koechler, in a comment to res. 1593, IPO 
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were effectively removing a piece of the situation and therefore there is no 
“situation” at all in the purest sense of the word, just a partial situation. 
In addition, the word/formulation “situation” does not invite to exclude 
anyone. 
It is also important to take into consideration why art. 13 b) is worded in that 
certain way. 
Why does the Rome-statute only give the Security Council the power to 
refer situations? 
 As with any legal document, the words that constitute it are not put together 
haphazardly. Careful consideration is put to each formulation and the 
document is analyzed, debated and rewritten several times before given its 
final form. The Rome-statute is no exception. As we have previously seen, 
one of the key issues at Rome was in fact the relationship between the 
Security Council and the ICC. How much influence should the Security 
Council have on the ICC?  
Initially, the ICC was not thought to have the independence from the UN it 
enjoys today. One of the major differences from the 94/96 ILC draft to the 
Rome-statute is the inclusion of art. 15, giving the ICC’s prosecutor power 
to initiate investigations and prosecutions. Such independence was given the 
prosecutor as an effort to reduce Security Council control of the ICC and 
thus increase the courts independence. This was something many states, 
particularly the “smaller ones” felt was of crucial importance as the security 
council with its five permanent members represent the power balance in the 
world, and an independent court would be viewed as more balanced view 
among the poorer states. The fact that the ICC’s prosecutor was given the 
power to iniate investigations , and that the Security Councils control of the 
ICC was reduced from the original draft, can be viewed as an argument that 
the ICC should have total independence, and that as such, by the Security 
Council excluding certain states from the ICC1s jurisdiction, goes beyond 
the power originally given them by art 13 b) 
 
4.5 Art 121 – “reservation” 
 
Furthermore art. 121 of the statute reads as follows “ no reservations may be 
made to this statute” 
So then, does the condition constitute a reservation? 
The prohibition on reservations means that states ratifying the treaty may not 
choose to make reservations regarding any provision they might feel is 
unfortunate. Should the condition  then prove to serve as a reservation to the 
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treaty, meaning it allows for a different approach that what is stated in the 
Statute, the referral could prove to be inadmissible to the ICC.  
Regarding whether or not the condition constitutes a reservation, one should 
first study the condition in res. 1593.   
Included at the request if the US they serve to prevent citizens from a non-
state party operating in a peace keeping mission in Darur from being 
prosecuted by the ICC. 
However, although the condition serves as a guarantee, it is in reality 
superfluous, not changing the status quo due to numerous provisions in the 
Rome-statute. 
Art. 8 of the Statute  gives the court jurisdiction “in particular” over “serious 
war crimes part of a plan or strategy” 
It is not highly likely that US personnel operating in a peacekeeping 
operation in Darfur would fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction in this regard. 
Although there is always a risk of peacekeeping personnel committing 
serious crimes when stationed abroad (rape is defined as a war-crime in the 
Rome-statute), these crimes will seldom be the result of a “plan or strategy” 
by the US government or army. Although art 8 of the Statute lists what 
crimes are to be viewed as war crimes and that unfortunately, these may be 
committed by peace keeping or invasion forces personnel, the gravity 
threshold is set so high that that it is very unlikely that any such crimes 
would meet them and thus be subject for investigation69
 Also, the ICC is a complementary judicial system70, meaning that the ICC 
only gains jurisdiction where the state refuses to prosecute its citizens 
suspected of committing war-crimes or the ICC finds that a prosecution is a 
“sham” just meant to keep the ICC at bay.  
These two provisions of the Rome-statute mean that regardless of the 
condition in res.1593, US citizens, or any citizens of any non-state party 
operating in peacekeeping operations in Darfur would highly unlikely be 
prosecuted for war crimes in Darfur. Furthermore, the US has a so called 
article 98 agreement with a host of states, giving the US a right to demand 
the extradition of its citizens in case of an arrest. This right is derived from 
art. 98 of the Rome-statute, a provision the US delegates in Rome managed 
to include on a late night meeting on the final evening of the conference. 
Although the meaning behind it was originally to make it possible for states 
                                                 
69 See ICC’s prosecutor Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s statement on the decision to not 
iniate investigations of alleged war crimes committed by coalition forces in Iraq, 
February 10 2006 www.icc-cpi.int 
70 Art 1 of the Statute 
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to respect already existing, of the time of adoption, bi-lateral agreements of 
extradition, the US argue that the wording does not invite to discriminate 
between already existing agreements and future ones. Then Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said regarding art 98 agreements that 
“fortunately there may be mechanism within the treaty by which we can 
work bilaterally with friends and allies… to prevent the jurisdiction of the 
treaty”71
 Obviously, such agreements would have to be signed before demanding 
extradition. Hence, the US immediately following the Rome-conference 
formulated an agreement, to be known as an art. 98 agreement, and  then 
“made their way around the world collecting signatures”, and although 
signatures have been known to be obtained through threats of withholding 
funds, withdrawal of army bases etc, more than ? states have signed.  Of 
course, if the ICC is to punish it first has to capture and be able to hold the 
perpetrator captive. The Rome-statute gives the ICC the right to demand 
extradition of individuals who are being held captive in a state the ICC has 
jurisdiction over, be it a state party or in this particular case  Sudan. 
Following. However art 98 as we have seen makes the ICC’s right to 
demand extradition from its state parties secondary to extradition agreements 
existing between states, and while it does not prevent the ICC from indicting 
a US citizen or even passing judgment in absentia, it does mean that the ICC 
might never be able to carry out the punishment. As the worlds sole 
remaining super power the US is in a unique position to negotiate such 
agreements, possibly leaving the world with a somewhat emasculated ICC. 
 
4.6 Art 12 2 a) 
 
Furthermore, as stated, art 12.2 a) of the Statute would give the ICC 
jurisdiction over peace keeping personnel from non-state parties operating in 
Sudan, providing the ICC has jurisdiction over Sudan, had it not been for the 
exclusion of jurisdiction for these nationals in res.1593. So does the 
resolution contradict art 12.2.a)? 
In letter, it is hard to argue the opposite. However, as the Vienna Convention 
art 31. 3 a) dictates; one should interpret the treaty(the Rome Statute) by 
taking onto account” any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty”. This means that even if art 12.2 a) 
                                                 
71  News Release of the United States Department of Defense May 6. 2002. 
www.defenselink.mil/releases/2002/b05062002_bt233-02.html 
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might seem at odds with res. 1593, one has to examine if there is any 
agreement of some kind following the completion of the treaty. 
In July 2002, the Security Council passed a resolution exempting  UN 
peacekeepers from the jurisdiction of the ICC for a period of twelve months, 
after art 16 of the Statute72. The resolution was passed after the US earlier 
that year  vetoed a renewal of the peace keeping operations in Bosnia on the 
grounds that an exemption for ICC’s jurisdiction over,their, peacekeepers 
was not included. Although the Security Council was opposed to the idea, a 
resolution resembling the one the US wanted to include earlier was then 
passed, and the US subsequently agreed to renew the mandate for peace 
keeping operations in Bosnia. This shows that the idea of the Security 
Council exempting certain groups of people is not a new one. However the 
problem lies in that it is the Security Council telling the ICC what to do or 
how to proceed. And the grounds under which the Security Council can bind 
the ICC through a chapter VII resolution or otherwise, is questionable. 
Dan Sarooshi argues that although Security Council resolutions under 
chapter VII are binding to all States, the ICC as an international, 
independent organ as such not in any way obligated to act a certain way. 
Sarooshi admits that the US is of a different opinion as illustrated by former 
US ambassador David Scheffer remarks that art 13 b) of the Rome Statute 
“enables the Security Council to shape the ICC’s jurisdiction”73 I personally 
agree with Mr. Sarooshi, I believe that the Security Council may very well 
instruct or attempt to “shape  the Court”, but if it falls outside the parameters 
set by the Rome Statute, the ICC is nor under any obligation to comply. In 
fact if it is in disagreement with the purpose and objective if the court, the 
Court may not even be allowed to comply. I find basis for this assumption in 
art. 17 of the Statute, which gives the court the power to decide the “issue of 
admissibility”, meaning that it is up to Mr. Moreno-Ocampo and the judges 
to determine the admissibility of res. 1593. 
 
 4,7 Remarks about the consistency and ability to bind the iCC 
 
In addition,  we have seen in the previous chapters,that one of the arguments 
against the legal validity of resolution 1593 was that it exceeds the powers 
                                                 
72 S/RES/1422 (2002) 
73 For more on this, see Mcgoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly, The Permanent International 
Criminal Court, Legal and Policy Issues,   Dan Sarooshi, the Peace and Justice paradox. 
P.96 
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granted to the Security  Council and as such , goes against the “sprit” of both 
Rome and the treaty. 
  However, the conference at Rome and the treaty itself were a result of 
compromise upon compromise. The group of the “like-minded” conceded to 
several provisions in order to gain acceptance for other more important, to 
them, matters. As did the “constrictive” group. 
These compromises, although possibly weakening the statute, made it 
possible to achieve the ultimate goal, a permanent international criminal 
court. 
Hence, res. 1593 does not necessarily go against the “spirit “ of Rome as the 
framers and all of the delegates at Rome did what they felt was necessary in 
order to create an institution the world has wanted for decades to help 
prevent war-crimes.  
The security council referral, although somewhat inconsistent with the Rome 
Statute, was a direct result of the desire to fight crimes committed against 
humanity in Darfur. War- crimes were undeniably being committed in 
Darfur and despite peace talks and peace-keeping operations from the AU, 
among others, the security council inevitably felt that a referral to the ICC 
would be the only way to combat the impunity which prevailed in Darfur. 
Granted, the Security Council could have set up an ad hoc tribunal in Darfur, 
but with the ICC in place ready to commence investigation, an ad hoc 
tribunal would have been a stab in the back to an institution the UN helped 
create. In addition, one of the reasons behind the ICC was that ad hoc 
tribunals were to costly, both in a financial but also time consuming way and 
after ICTR and ICTY were to be avoided. 
By setting up an ad hoc tribunal in Darfur the Security Council would send 
the rest of the international community a signal that the ICC for reasons 
political or practical was not indeed the institution to deal with war crimes 
the world had wanted it to be. After all, had the Security Council not 
referred the situation of Darfur to the ICC, when would they ever refer a 
situation to the ICC? 
 
In effect, by not referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, the Security 
Council would make their power of referral Rome a “dead letter”.  
 In conclusion, res. 1593 by the Security Council, although not 
uncontroversial, was at the time being, perceived as the best possible way to 
deal with the situation in Darfur. It is safe to say that a referral without the 
condition would have been vetoed by the US, and then the ICC would not 
have obtained jurisdiction to Darfur, and the brutal actions would have 
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continued. In the choice between the two “evils” the Security Council thus 
chose the lesser one. 
 
     
    Although one referral is hardly enough to set a precedence cast in stone, it 
is still the first of its kind and constitutes a valuable norm of which to judge 
future referrals by. The next time the security council finds it necessary to 
refer a situation to the ICC, the US would most likely have to start with a 
“clean sheet” again, meaning adding a similar condition would have to be 
proposed again and not be taken for granted, the rest of the permanent 
members of the security council could find it difficult to find adequate 
reasons for not including such a condition this time around all the while they 
did on 1 April 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
5. What might be deduced from res 1593? 
  
We have seen that one of the goals for the International Criminal Court is to  
“put an end to impunity” for perpetrators of international crimes.74
Although such crimes may never be prevented, it is nevertheless important 
for the international community to signal that it does not tolerate such 
crimes. In order for the ICC to achieve this objective of ending impunity, it 
is of importance that it has universal jurisdiction, or at least as close to it as 
possible.  
After all, what function can a court without the ability to prosecute really 
serve?  As previously stated, the ICC has inherent jurisdiction over all 
member states, meaning that regarding these states, the ability to  investigate 
and prosecute is undeniable as the ICC’s prosecutor has the power to initiate 
investigations and prosecution on his own in these matters.75  
However, although there are 100 state parties to the ICC, there are still a 
substantial number of states that are not party to the treaty, and they may 
only fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction by way of referral from the Security 
Council76. In addition, personnel from non-state parties operating on 
                                                 
74 The Rome Statute, Preamble 
75 Art 13 c) of the Statute. 
76 Id Art 13 b) of the Statute 
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territory over which the ICC has jurisdiction, may also be subject to the 
ICC’s jurisdiction77.  
This means that for the ICC to have true universal jurisdiction, the Security 
Council must prove a willingness to refer situations to the ICC. 
It is of little use that, out of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council, three of them are state parties78, if the remaining two79 exercises 
their veto right and blocks any attempt of referral.  
Granted, the ICC will still be able to investigate and prosecute in those 
situations it has jurisdiction80, but what legitimacy and recognition will the 
Court have, if it is unable to prosecute serious international crimes due to 
lack of jurisdiction? Might it not be viewed as unfair that some states really 
have immunity? 
Now that the US abstained from voting on res. 1593, and thus abstained 
from using their veto, what does this imply regarding the US’ policy on the 
ICC? As evident by the reaction of many to res. 1593, the US was, more so 
than China, perceived as being the biggest threat to referrals to the ICC from 
the Security Council. The US had been the staunchest critic of the ICC and 
there was a question of whether or not the Security Council would be able to 
refer situations to the ICC because of the US’ opposition to the Court and 
the veto power the US has in the Security Council.81
Therefore the question arises as to what one can deduce from res. 1593 in 
the context of the US/ICC relationship and why is the US policy on the ICC 
important? 
 Furthermore, what will res. 1593 and the exclusion of jurisdiction for 
personnel from non-state parties outside Sudan represent regarding Security 
Council control over the ICC and future scope of  the ICC’s jurisdiction?  
 
5.1 US view on the ICC 
 
 
In order to understand and discuss the reasons behind the US’ persistence to 
include such a condition in the referral, and also why they allowed the 
                                                 
77 Id Art 12. 2 a) of the Statute 
78 France, UK; Russia 
79 China and the US 
80 Aside from the situation in Darfur, The ICC is currently investigating the situation in 
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, both of whom are State Parties. See 
www.icc-cpi.int 
81 See Fredric L Sturgis’ article on  the UN Commission’s report on violations against 
Humanitarian Law in Darfur. February 2005. Available at www.asil.org/insights/2005 
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referral to pass, it is beneficial to further examine the US policy towards the 
ICC. 
  As the worlds only superpower, with its military superiority, the US is 
convinced that it is their responsibility to promote peace and democracy to 
the parts of the world that are unwilling or unable to do so themselves 82As 
such, they argue that their personnel will be more likely to be stationed 
around the world on a much larger scale than any other states’ personnel. 
Therefore they feel that they will be at a much higher risk of 
investigation/prosecution, especially given the fact that the US has many 
enemies around the world and that that increases the risk of violent episodes. 
    The fact that the security council has to pass a resolution in order to deter 
an investigation, art.16, meaning that if one of the permanent members 
vetoed the resolution the investigation would be free to continue, rather than 
the other way around which was the way the US wanted it and also what was 
proposed by the ILC draft, was one of the reasons why the US ended up 
voting against the statute in Rome.  The US is most hesitant to give away 
jurisdiction of their citizens to an independent institution such as the ICC. 
Partly because they fear politically motivated prosecutions, a fear that is 
somewhat unsubstantiated all the while the integrity of the prosecutor and 
judges of the ICC is undeniable, and also because the army, especially the 
pentagon, feels that it would hamper the decision making both in the strategy 
room and on the battle field. 
    Immediately following the Rome conference, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee summoned a hearing inquiring the US policy towards 
the ICC, ,83  Ambassador David Scheffer listed these points as the main 
reasons the US opposed the statute: 
That the ICC has jurisdiction over third parties after Art. 12 of the statute, 
the lack of  an opt-out provision in the statute, the prohibition of reservations 
to the Statute84,the power given the ICC’s prosecutor to iniate proceedings, 
and finally the inclusion of “aggression” to the elements of crime without 
defining the term. 
In  speech addressing why the US opposed to the Statute 2002, under 
secretary of state Mark Grossman stated that although the US would always 
be supportive of the prosecution and punishment of war criminals “that 
                                                 
82 The US State Department asserts that it is the US’ goal to “promote democracy…assist 
newly formed democracies….and identify and denounce regimes that deny their citizens 
the right to choose their leader”     See www.state.gov/g/drl/democ 
83www.senate.gov 
84 The US Senate has a constitutional right to propose amendments/reservations to any 
treaty before the US can ratify that treaty. 
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should be done wherever possible through reinforcing the capability of 
domestic legal systems”. He then went on to name the, then recent, creation 
of the hybrid tribunal in Sierra Leone. This view on international criminal 
and humanitarian law is in compliance with the US’ previous efforts to bring 
war criminals to justice, they were actively involved in the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals following WWII and also the tribunals of Rwanda the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY) He also said that the Rome Statute 
“dilutes the authority of the UN SC” What under secretary Grossman was 
referring to was most likely art. 16 of the Statute which, as previously stated, 
only allows the UN SC to defer investigations through a resolution, meaning 
that any of the five permanent members can veto it, thus allowing the 
investigation to proceed. The US, of course wanted it the other way around, 
where the UN SC had to green light every investigation allowing for a single 
state such as the US to block any investigation it wanted to. Since the US 
has a somewhat strong control of the UN SC, a strong SC control over the 
ICC would imply a strong US control over the ICC.  
   The US and its delegates at Rome felt the Rome-statute was a step in the 
right direction, and they managed to incorporate many of the US’ views on 
the ICC into the Statute. Despite this, they inevitably came to the conclusion 
that the statute did not harbor sufficient safeguards, and  felt that the Rome 
Statute fell short of what they could accept and ended up voting against it. 
Although then US president Bill Clinton did sign the Statute in, literally the 
last hour before it closed for signatures in 2000, he also stated that he did not 
or would not recommend any future US government to ratify the treaty, and 
the signing was most likely to ensure the US would still be  involved with 
the future shaping of the statute. 
On May 6 2002, the US government delivered a letter to the UN SC “giving 
formal notice that the US has no intentions of becoming a party to the Rome 
Statute” (although the letter did not use the term withdrawal it did request 
that the US decision be reflected in the treaty’s signing list, effectively 
removing their signature)  
This implied that the US would refuse to cooperate in any way with the ICC, 
be it of a financial or intelligence-sharing nature, and at the same time 
enabled the US to more actively pursue work against the ICC either by 
proposing establishments of ad hoc tribunals or gathering signatures on their 
art 98 agreements. The US ambassador for war-crimes issues Pierre-Richard 
Prosper stated in this regard that the “(ICC) prosecutor should build his case 
on his own and not rely on US information or cooperation”  
 Without US cooperation/participation the ICC and its prosecutor risk not 
being able to benefit from the US’ huge amount of intelligence and 
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information regarding current/future investigations. Although the state 
parties of the ICC  themselves have more than adequate intelligence 
agencies, with the US as the worlds only superpower and with its military 
superiority it is quite obvious that the US is in possession of information/ 
able to obtain such information that could prove  to be of crucial value to the 
ICC’s prosecutor investigating a case/situation. 
This means that not only is the US’ policy on the ICC important for the 
Security Councils ability to refer situations to the ICC, but also to some 
extent important for the ICC to investigate all situations, as the decision of 
whether or not to prosecute relies on the information available to the ICC’s 
prosecutor85. In addition, it could also provide for a more effective court 
with a much more cohesive support allowing it broader acceptance 
throughout the international community. An ICC with US support would 
translate as a much improved likelihood of UN SC referrals passing and 
furthermore give the ICC  stronger leverage concerning non-state parties by 
being able to say “the rest of the world is on board, why aren’t you?”  
 
However, it is a fact that the US , in part because of their role as a 
superpower but also of their recent forays into foreign territory( Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Somalia etc.), have a substantial number of sworn enemies 
around the world. Many of these states could view an international criminal 
court with US participation as just another mechanism in the US’ grand 
scheme to control the rest of the world, thus diminishing the legitimacy of 
the ICC.  Although this argument is not necessarily without merit, as the US 
“war on terrorism” is perceived by many as a “war on Islam/Arab world”, 
 
 
5.3 US view on the ICC post re. 1593 
 
 
 
As the Rome Statute has not been subjected to any amendments since its 
adoption in 1998, can one assume that the US has changed their view on the 
ICC, or are there other factors that may have contributed to apparent change 
of course by the US?  
                                                 
85 In ICC prosecutor Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s response to alleged war crimes by 
coalition forces in Iraq, one of the phrases that he used the most was..”according to the 
present information”, thus reiterating the value of information.  
See www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp/otp_com.html 
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 Although the condition does not single out US citizens as being exempt 
from the courts jurisdiction, it is of little doubt that they were included as a 
direct result of the US government s attempts to not give away the power to 
prosecute any US citizens. 
Although the US will never concede to it, speculation arises as to whether 
the US, given its long held hostility to the ICC made sure the resolution 
contained the condition in the hope that it then might be deemed by either 
the other members of the security council or by the ICC as overreaching the 
security councils powers and thus be declared not valid. Opening up the way 
for an ad hoc tribunal in Darfur, which is what the US have wanted all along. 
Many were surprised when the US abstained from voting on res. 1593 last 
April, thus allowing for the resolution to be passed. 
However, as we have seen in chapter ? upon closer examination the decision 
to abstain from voting on the res. did in fact not veer significantly from the 
position held by the US and its delegates at Rome 
By including the condition, the US managed in 2005 to do what they could 
not seven years earlier at Rome, namely to make it possible for a Rome-
statute with an opt-in clause. 
This could simply be the US’ attempt to block the referral without being 
publicly responsible for doing so, which would have caused them 
embarrassment all the time it was the US who initiated the report on Darfur. 
 
 
 
Given the US’ long outspoken hostility towards the ICC and the Rome-
statute as it stands, it is highly unlikely that the US would have let a referral 
without any conditions pass. Now, whether or not the conditions prove to set 
a precedence in future referrals, the fact still remains that res. 1593 was 
indeed passed with a condition and that leads to the question of whether or 
not the decision by the US to abstain from voting was just a “one-time deal”, 
allowing the US to  “save face” in front of the international community by 
not allowing the impunity for criminals in Darfur to continue, while at the 
same time providing adequate safeguards for US personnel, or if it is to be 
interpretated as a  softening in the US hostility towards the ICC. Although 
the passing of res. 1593 was met with mild surprise by many observers and 
governments around the world, it ( the res.) does not in fact signal anything 
new, as we saw in paragraph? Under no circumstances will the US concede 
jurisdiction unconditionally to the ICC, and thus they will not sign a treaty to 
that effect. The US made their argument concerning US personnel operating 
in peacekeeping operations, but the line between peacekeeping forces and 
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invasion troops can at times seem blurred. With the inclusion of the 
condition, the US managed to obtain an additional safeguard, further 
prohibiting the occurrence of frivolous, in the eyes of the US, prosecutions, 
and as such, the outcome of res.1593 does not necessarily differ from the 
view held by the US at Rome. In addition, another US concern over the 
Rome-statute was stronger Security Council control over the ICC. In this 
particular case, the situation in Darfur was indeed referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council after they reviewed the commissioned report on the 
situation. Given the fact that this was the first time the ICC commenced an 
investigation, it solidifies jurisdiction by way of referral from the Security 
Council, further strengthening security council control of the ICC. Again, 
this is in compliance with US view on the court. 
 
 
 However, it could  mean that the US is gradually trying to incorporate their 
view on the ICC into the statute, either by setting a precedence or by 
pressuring the member states to adopt needed provisions at the review 
conference. There are especially three scenarios that present themselves as 
valid courses the US might take regarding their attitude towards the ICC.  
The first is that the US has reconsidered its view on the ICC and by allowing 
the referral to pass, they are signaling that they intend to embrace the Court 
and even join it. Any such notions can be effectively dismissed. First of all, 
the US did not vote for the resolution, as they would have done had they 
wanted to signal their acceptance for the court. Second, representatives from 
the US government have repeatedly stated that the US believes that the 
Rome Statute is flawed and has no intention of signing it. 
This leads to the second scenario, that the US still is opposed to the Statute 
and that they will continue to work towards weakening the Court. The fact 
that the inclusion of the condition in the referral in reality added nothing new 
to what was already in the Rome Statute serves to illustrate this. There is 
nothing to suggest that the US has altered its view on the Court, no new 
developments. However, again the US abstained from voting. Had they 
really wanted to send a message to the world that they would never 
cooperate with the ICC, they would have vetoed the referral. 
Of course, the fact that the US allowed for the resolution to pass can be 
explained by either their desire to punish those responsible for war crimes 
and coming to a conclusion that as long as an ad hoc tribunal was out of the 
question, a referral to the ICC would be the best way to do so. Thus letting 
their moral obligation outweigh their opposition to the Court. Or it could 
also be, in connection with the previous point, that their decision to abstain 
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from voting was an attempt to save face in front of their allies and the rest of 
the international community. It was indeed the US who initiated the report 
on Darfur and  President George W. Bush has stated that the US is 
“committed to combating war crimes”86thus making it difficult for the US to 
provide for the continuance of impunity for the war criminals in Darfur, by 
blocking the referral to the ICC. 
 The inclusion of the condition in the referral, however superfluous , may 
have been what was needed for the US to allow for the resolution to pass 
while still keeping its position of opposition to the Court intact. The 
condition, in a sense made it tolerable for the US. 
This leads straight to the third and more likely scenario, namely that the US 
wants to see the Court in action , to examine it behavior further before it 
decides what action to take next. The fact that there is a review conference if 
the Statute in 2009, where State Parties may propose amendments to the 
Statute, is not lost on the US. By signing and ratifying the Statute prior to 
the review conference, the US would forfeit any leverage as to amendments 
of the Statute. Granted, the US would then be able to propose amendments 
themselves as a State Party, but they would be in a much better negotiating 
situation if they are able to dangle the possibility of them joining the ICC in 
front of the State Parties. Obviously, the referral made it possible for the 
Court to start investigating the situation in Darfur, an investigation that 
determined that “The jurisdiction of the Court covers the situation in Darfur 
since July 1. 2002 ….and the further commission of grave crimes will be the 
subject of on-going monitoring , investigation and potential prosecution by 
the ICC”87. 
However, what does this referral mean in the broader scope for the Court? 
Will it, now that the US has eased up on its position of never voting a 
referral through to the ICC88 have the chance of finally functioning as a 
permanent international criminal court with universal jurisdiction, or will it 
take  the more practical approach of a constructive partnership, and in either 
case, what would be the consequences, especially regarding the Courts 
legitimacy? 
                                                 
86 Foreign Press Center Briefing by US Ambassador for War Crimes Issues Pierre-
Richard Prosper, May 6 2002,  www.state.gov 
87 Report of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, pursuant to UNSCR. 1593 (2005) June 29. 2005 
88 Although the US in fact did not vote to pass resolution 1593, a case can be made that 
their decision to abstain from voting was decisive in the passing of the resolution, thus 
achieving the same result as voting . 
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Regardless of whether or not the US wants to sign the treaty or become a 
party to it, the fact still remains that now that they have allowed for the first 
situation to be referred to the ICC, and the US might find it difficult to veto a 
new resolution to refer a situation to the ICC. Therefore, a constructive 
partnership between the US and the ICC, could prove to be beneficial for 
both. It would ensure the US that none of their personnel are never to be 
prosecuted by the ICC, as the US no doubt will make sure that the next 
referral also contains some sort of condition regarding exclusive jurisdiction 
over their personnel, while at the same time enabling the US to continue to 
pursue art. 98 agreements and lobby for amendments in the Statute at the 
review conference. The ICC, on the other hand would be able to be assured 
that the US would not veto any referrals to the ICC by the Security Council, 
and the ICC would also in essence, acquire a universal jurisdiction deriving 
from the powers of the Security Council acting under chapter VII. An 
important exclusion however to that jurisdiction, is that of China and the US. 
China and the US are the only two permanent members of the Security 
Council who has not signed the Rome Statute. This means that the only way 
they may fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC is by a referral from the 
Security Council. A referral that, of course, China or the US could veto and 
thus keep from reaching the ICC. In other words, the US could enjoy the 
same impunity that they will not allow others, if they were to cooperate with, 
but not become party to, the ICC. Because, as we have seen, the gravity 
threshold is very high for any crimes committed by US personnel operating 
in a peace keeping mission in a state that the Court has jurisdiction over. 
Which would be the only other way for US citizens to fall under the Courts 
jurisdiction, In addition the crimes committed would most unlikely meet the 
requirement of being part of a “plan, or policy” 89
Now, a constructive partnership like this might be what is necessary to make 
the ICC capable of dealing with situations such as Darfur, but what 
messages will such a partnership send to the rest of the international 
 With the ICC busy investigating the situation in Darfur, the US get to 
further study the proceedings of the Court as well as the integrity of the 
judges and the prosecutor.  
The ICC’s prosecutor has the power to initiate proceedings on his own and it 
is the bench who determines whether or not the requirements for 
admissibility are met, especially regarding whether an investigation by the 
concerning state is legitimate following the criteria listed in art. 17 of the 
Statute,and the US has expressed serious concerns over this. They fear that 
                                                 
89 Art 8 1. Of the Statute 
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such independency might result in politically motivated trials and frivolous 
investigations 
The US could very well have chosen to veto the resolution citing its 
concerns about the Statute, but the fact that it did not speak volumes and has 
to be given more weight than the statements that have followed from US 
officials in the wake of the resolution. Although US statements and 
comments regarding their relationship to the ICC are by no means to be 
taken lightly, after all they are per definition an expression of official US 
policy, the comments made might very well be a part of the US’ negotiating 
strategy towards the ICC and by allowing for the resolution to pass, the ball 
is now in the ICC’s court. 
  It is easy to see the US’ benefits of joining the ICC. It would strengthen 
relations with their allies, like France, the UK and Russia who are warm 
supporters of the Court, and it would furthermore give the US a chance to 
play an active role in the shaping of the court, as art 9 2. Regulates that only 
the judges, the prosecutor or a State Party may propose amendments to the 
Statute. 
Although only State Parties may propose amendments at the review 
conference, that is not to say that the US can not suggest what it would take 
for them to join the treaty, and subsequently any of the State Parties could 
propose those certain amendments.  
 If one looks at the resolution in this manner, the US decision to abstain from 
voting begins to make sense. They wanted to see the ICC operating in order 
to evaluate the integrity of its prosecutor and judges, but at the same time did 
not want to be seen as to giving in to international pressure of relinquishing 
their opposition towards the ICC. The inclusion of the condition gives the 
impression that it is the SC that has succumbed to the view of the US and 
not the US that has conceded anything. In addition they managed to 
communicate some of the amendments that they (US) feel are necessary if 
they are to join the treaty;  A guarantee that no US citizens will be 
prosecuted by the ICC, in essence the US are skeptical to the issue of 
complementarity, as the Security Council , and by that the US, has no 
control over the decision of when a national prosecution is not legit. 
In any event, one of the things that can be said with certainty is that the US 
will keep its options open regarding what course to take regarding the ICC. 
It is highly unlikely that they will permanently decide anything before the 
review conference in 2009.  
 History has shown the US that persistence pays off, and what the US wants, 
it has a habit of obtaining. The treaty of the Law of the sea serves to 
illustrate this point. In 1982 this treaty was adopted, however the US had 
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concerns relating to certain seabed mining provisions and refused to sign it. 
After more than a decade of negotiations, a legally-binding agreement 
altering the agreement to be in correspondence with the US view on seabed 
mining, was concluded and the US subsequently signed. As all treaties 
signed by the US must receive the consent, and also advice, by the US 
Senate before it can be ratified, the US has yet to ratify it, although it has a 
broad support in congress. 
   In a similar fashion, by getting the condition included in the referral, the 
US could be signaling what it would take in order for them to sign the treaty, 
, and ratify it. In resolution 1593 they incorporated a condition which the 
ICC let override an existing provision in the Rome Statute that was 
somewhat inconsistent with the resolution. Obviously, it would take several 
amendments to the Rome Statute for the US to embrace, the possibility of 
reservation with regards to certain provisions of the Statute is among the 
most crucial in that respect as the US claim it violates their constitution to 
ratify a treaty prohibiting reservations. Likewise would the US need to be 
absolutely confident that the ICC would not prosecute any US citizens but 
rather let the US take care of the investigation and prosecution of their own, 
citing the principle of complementarity.  The review conference of the 
Rome-statute, to be held in 2009, will most likely be the center of intense 
negotiations as was the Rome conference itself, and the outcome is far from 
certain. However, the US and the rest of the international community got to 
see the integrity of the ICC when on February 10 2006 the ICC’s prosecutor 
Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced that, after receiving over 240 
“communications concerning the situation in Iraq”  he would not be 
initiating any investigations of situations in Iraq.90 Both private citizens and 
Non-Governmental Organizations, NGO’s; had done what the US feared 
they would do, namely accuse the coalition forces of war crimes.. Mr. 
Moreno-Ocampo stated that although he regretted the loss of lives, he had a 
“very specific role and mandate, as specified in the Rome Statute” and that 
he could only initiate an investigation “if the available information satisfies 
the criteria of the Statute”. He then went on to note that the ICC did not have 
jurisdiction over Iraq and as such, only had jurisdiction over citizens of State 
Parties operating in Iraq, With regards to the alleged crimes, he stated that 
since the Statute does not define “aggression”, the court “may not exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime until a provision has been adopted which defines 
the crime”, and that happen no sooner than the review conference in 2009. 
Mr. Moreno-Ocampo also dismissed allegations of genocide, Crimes against 
                                                 
90 Iraq response 10.02.06 www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp/otp_com.html 
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Humanity and war crimes as not meeting the criteria set by the Statute 
recognizing that the available information “provided no reasonable 
indica(tion) of…widespread or systematic attack” or “did not indicate 
intentional attacks on a civilian population”. There was however reason to 
believe that the war crime of willful killing and inhuman treatment, but Mr. 
Moreno-Ocampo stated that the low number of victims, 4-12 and less that 20 
respectively, did not meet the sufficient gravity threshold.  
Throughout the response, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo step by step takes us through 
the allegations and the relevant provisions in the Statute explaing repeatedly  
that he is bound by the statute and its provisions.  
The decision reached by the ICC prosecutor was not very surprising to those 
who know the provisions of the Statute but to hear the reasoning behind Mr. 
Moreno-Ocampo’s decision not to investigate stands as a testament to the 
integrity of the Court, its sole determinedness to rule by law as opposed to 
politics, and was without doubt welcome in the eyes of the US government. 
Possibly soothing some of the US’ fears of an unaccountable prosecutor and 
frivolous prosecutions.  
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now that we have seen the ICC’s independency being somewhat 
diminished, in the capacity of the Security Council passing res. 1593 with a 
condition that is not consistent with the Rome statute and which in turn led 
the US to allow for the resolution to pass, what consequences will that spell 
for the ICC? 
As previously mentioned, during the Rome Conference India pressed for no 
Security Council control over the ICC, and the Indian representative to the 
UN Sixth Committee, Prem Singh Chandumajra, stated during the 
Committees discussion of the Rome Conference, that  “by subordinating the 
future court (the ICC) to the discretion of the (Security) Councils five 
permanent members” was an “overstretched interpretation of the powers of 
the Security Council” and that India doubted that the ICC under this 
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foundation “ had prospects of ever becoming universal.”91What Mr. 
Chandumajra probably was referring to was the veto power each of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council has, and as such it is  not very 
likely that the US or China as the only non-state parties of the five, will ever 
allow a referral concerning themselves pass. In addition, by granting such 
impunity to these states, it also reinforces the perception that many states 
have that the worlds power balance is reflected in the field of international 
criminal law. The seemingly unfair distribution of  power in the Security 
Council has been addressed several times by the smaller states, as evident by 
the already mentioned discussion of the inclusion of additional permanent 
members of the ICC.92  Nevertheless, it serves as an indicator as to what 
many states feel would constitute a threat to an ICC with broad recognition 
and legitimacy. 
 Now although an ICC with US cooperation could be beneficial for the 
Court, it all depends on the grounds of US cooperation. 
 
 There is little doubt that the ICC in the investigation of the situation in 
Darfur will operate in a cautious and just matter, especially since this is the 
first time the Court obtains jurisdiction by a referral from the Secutiy 
Council, and the integrity of the ICC’s prosecutor, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo, has 
yet to be challenged. However, with a political body like the Security 
Council determining that certain individuals are to be exempt from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, and at the persistence of the US no less, it politicizes the court 
more than the Rome Statute allowed for. The fact that the US  is not  a party 
to the Rome Statute may in fact even have contributed to the large number 
of signatures and ratifications. As the US can be perceived as wanting to 
police the world, while not applying the same standards to themselves all the 
time93, an ICC without US participation might have been viewed by some 
states as somewhat of a guarantee that the US would not be allowed to 
influence proceedings at this institution. Therefore it is not unlikely that now 
that the US in fact has shown the capability of influencing the scope of 
jurisdiction for the ICC and that the Security Council and the ICC allowed 
for it, the Courts recognition as a legitimate Court where politics are 
secondary to the letter of the law, might be in danger.  
In order for the ICC’s jurisdiction to be truly universal, the jurisdiction must 
be applied not based on politics but on facts and substantive law. The 
                                                 
91 GA/L/3079 
92 Id chapter ? 
93 The revealing of torture of prisoners at Abu al-ghraib serves to illustrate this 
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jurisdiction, as well as the Court, must also be recognized as being impartial 
and just.94 In addition the Court has to be able to obtain custody of the 
offender for the jurisdiction to have any significance. Although it can try the 
perpetrator in absentia, as long as the ICC is not able to bring the suspect to 
court physically or to incarcerate the convict, the importance of jurisdiction 
is somewhat diminished. As we have seen by the US’ eagerness to sign art. 
98 agreements with different states, the ICC might never be able to carry out 
any punishment on US citizens as long as the US is a non-state party, thus 
granting a possibility of impunity for them. This, paired with the US 
“control” over Security Council referrals to the ICC95, raises the issue of 
selective jurisdiction. If one is to define selective jurisdiction as jurisdiction 
that is applied on a basis of political reasoning rather than an indiscriminate 
application of facts, then the degree of selective jurisdiction is proportionate 
with the Security Council control of the ICC.  
 
 
 
Although  the referral from the security council was very important to the 
courts future allowing it to launch its first investigation based on referral 
from the Security Council, the inclusion of the condition has caused much 
discussion as to what it might do to the future of the ICC in regards of its 
legitimacy and recognition. 
 
It is a paradox that both the US and smaller countries like India fear the 
same thing; unfair, politically motivated investigations and prosecutions. 
However, as this paper has shown, they want to use different approaches in 
the pursuit of avoiding such proceedings. 
 
It is nevertheless up to the ICC and its prosecutor and judges to prove their 
integrity both towards the US but also the rest of the world.  They have to 
show that they are indeed the fair and just court it was designed to be, in 
                                                 
94 Dan Sarooshi describes in the article “The peace and justice paradox” that prior to the 
Rome Conference, several States “the Non-Aligned countries”among them Italy and 
Indonesia, stressed the “importance of the ICC being independent as a judicial institution 
from political influence of any kind, including that of UN organs and in particular the 
Security Council”. McGoldrick ,Rowe and Donnelly; The permanent international court, 
legal and policy issues, USA 2004 
95 As illustrated by their success in excluding jurisdiction for non-state parties’ personel 
in Darfur for the ICC in res. 1593 
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order to gain acceptability and help put an end to impunity for war criminals 
and punish those guilty of international crimes.  
Continued US hostility towards the ICC could in the end spell the end of 
referrals from the Security Council to the ICC. If the US decides to exercise 
its veto every time a referral of a situation to the ICC is voted upon, Given 
the US tendency of isolationism , it is not such an unlikely thought as one 
might immediately think. Therefore the future of the ICC hinges on the fact 
that the ICC needs even more ratifications than there already  are to the 
Rome Statute, in order to approach the goal of universal jurisdiction. 
Although there will still be states expressing concern and hostility towards 
the ICC, it would have a much more cohesive and authourative support 
behind it with the US as a member state. Although again, the integrity of the 
ICC as a purely judicial body, will be put to its test as it was following the 
passing of res. 1593. The integrity did not pass that test as the US managed 
to incorporate their policy on the ICC into the res. and therefore also into the 
Court. It is of less importance that the US personnel, or other, would 
probably not have been the victim of investigation and prosecution of the 
ICC96anyway, it was the judicial integrity of the Court that was tainted with 
politics, and that may be difficult for some states to accept, thus limiting the 
recognition and legitimacy of the ICC. 
 
 
 
 
With all the talk about “universal jurisdiction” it can be useful to keep in 
mind that the ICC also is in need of “universal recognition”. That the 
international community views the ICC as a legitimate court dedicated to 
combating war crimes and the impunity for war crimes as opposed to just 
another expression of the balance of power in the world, is vital for the 
future legitimacy of the ICC. 
With the Rome Statute’s expressed aim to end impunity for war criminals 
and thus “contribute to the prevention of such crimes”97 is it not imperative 
that accountability for these crimes includes all? Should the US further insist 
on being elevated above the very jurisdiction they infer on other states, 
either through military action or by allowing for a referral to the ICC to pass 
in the Security Council, it would constitute a serious threat that could 
                                                 
96 Due to art 98 agreements, principle of complementarity, and the gravity threshold for 
crimes in the Rome Statute. 
97 The Rome Statute, the preamble 
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undermine the legitimacy of the ICC. The justice that is to be served would 
undeniably have an element of selectivity and could furthermore be difficult 
for the ICC, in the long run, to justify. After all, what legitimacy does a court 
have who prosecute only the weak? 
  One of the very purposes behind the creation of the ICC was to avoid 
future ad hoc tribunals, partly because of the fact that they provided for 
random prosecutions and had an element of selectivity. As such, it would be 
a step backwards for the ICC to allow that sense of randomness and 
selectivity to permit entering the Court. It for sure would not inspire other 
states to become a party to the Court, and it could even cause some members 
to pull out. States like Congo, Afghanistan, Liberia and Serbia and 
Montenegro have already ratified the treaty98, all states with a violent past 
but willing to do their part in the battle against impunity for war crimes. It is 
of crucial importance that those who are already member states remain so , 
and that even more states continue to join. Then, one can truly speak of 
universal jurisdiction.  
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